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NOTE
MONTANA'S CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM STATUTE:
AN AFFRONT TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Lawrence F. Reger
I. INTRODUCTION
In the winter of 1995, just before trouble with the "Freemen"
erupted in Jordan, Montana, a call to arms went out in the west-
ern part of the state. Montana militia members recruited all
good "patriots" to protect the people of Ravalli County from a
"tyrannical" government by arresting various state officials and
trying them for treason in "Common Law Courts." However, the
State of Montana met this challenge to government authority,
armed with a statute adopted in the early part of the twentieth
century--one which purported "to deal with those social ele-
ments which advocate violence, subversion, and destruction."'
After the State of Montana charged two self-proclaimed leaders
of the Montana Militia with felony criminal syndicalism,' the
judiciary was forced to decide whether the law was constitution-
al. Though few debate that Montana's criminal syndicalism stat-
ute is unconstitutional, the State contended that it could be
construed in a constitutional manner.3
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute was adopted in
1973, when the Criminal Law Commission combined several
outdated laws into a single statute criminalizing the advocacy,
1. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105 (Criminal Law Commission Comments in An-
notations) (1996).
2. See Amd. Information at 1, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st Dist. Ct.
Mont. filed June 26, 1995); Information at 1, State v. Greenup, No CR-95-52 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed May 2, 1995).
3. See e.g., John Connor, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Address at James R.
Browning Symposium, University of Montana School of Law (Oct. 4-5, 1996).
1
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promotion, and dissemination of materials advocating unlawful
action in Montana.4  Several other states have criminal
syndicalism statutes, some of which the United States Supreme
Court has declared unconstitutional in light of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 5
In 1977, Montana slightly amended its criminal syndicalism
statute. This statute now reads as follows:
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105. Criminal syndicalism.
(1) "Criminal syndicalism" means the advocacy of crime, mali-
cious damage or injury to property, violence, or other unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political ends.
(2) A person commits the offense of criminal syndicalism if he
purposely' or knowingly:
7
4. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105 (1973) (replacing Revised Codes of Mont.
§ 94-4401, Sedition; § 94-4402, Punishment for sedition; § 94-4403, Emergency clause;
and § 94-4404, Criminal syndicalism (Smith 1947)) provides:
(1) "Criminal syndicalism" means the advocacy of crime, malicious damage
or injury to property, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political ends.
(2) A person commits the offense of criminal syndicalism if he purposely or
knowingly:
(a) orally or by means of writing, advocates or promotes the doc-
trine of criminal syndicalism;
(b) organizes or becomes a member of any assembly, group, or
organization which he knows is advocating or promoting the doc-
trine of criminal syndicalism; or
(c) for or on behalf of another whose purpose is to advocate or
promote the doctrine of criminal syndicalism, distributes, sells,
publishes, or publicly displays any writing advocating or advertis-
ing such doctrine.
(3) A person convicted of the offense of criminal syndicalism shall be im-
prisoned in the state prison for a term not to exceed 10 years.
(4) Whoever, being the owner or in possession or control of any premises,
knowingly permits any assemblage of persons to use such premises for the
purpose of advocating or promoting the doctrine of criminal syndicalism
shall be fined not to exceed $500 or imprisoned in the county jail for a
term not to exceed 6 months, or both.
5. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937).
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(63) (1995) provides that "a person acts pur-
posely with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an of-
fense if it is the person's conscious object to engage in that conduct or cause that
result .. . ."
7. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(34) (1995) provides that "a person acts
knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defin-
ing an offense when the person is aware of the person's own conduct or that the
2
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(a) orally or by means of writing, advocates or promotes
the doctrine of criminal syndicalism;
(b) organizes or becomes a member of any assembly,
group, or organization which he knows is advocating or
promoting the doctrine of criminal syndicalism; or
(c) for or on behalf of another whose purpose is to advo-
cate or promote the doctrine of criminal syndicalism, dis-
tributes, sells, publishes, or publicly displays any writing
advocating or advertising such doctrine.
(3) A person convicted of the offense of criminal syndicalism
shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term not to exceed
10 years.
(4) Whoever, being the owner or in possession or control of
any premises, knowingly permits any assemblage of persons to
use such premises for the purpose of advocating or promoting
the doctrine of criminal syndicalism shall be fined not to exceed
$500 or imprisoned in the county jail for a term not to exceed 6
months, or both.8
Section 45-8-105 was derived from a Minnesota criminal
syndicalism statute.9 The Montana Criminal Law Commission
stated that its intent was to "deal with those social elements
which advocate violence, subversion, and destruction" and to
modernize the statute for application to present social needs.' °
However, neither the Criminal Law Commission nor the legisla-
ture defined the precise social needs they were trying to meet.1
Part II of this note examines the historical circumstances
that led to the adoption of criminal syndicalism laws and dis-
cusses relevant United States Supreme Court decisions. Part III
circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of the con-
duct described by a statute defining an offense when the person is aware that it is
highly probable that the result will be caused by the person's conduct. When knowl-
edge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of the offense, knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence ... 
8. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105 (1995).
9. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105 (Criminal Law Commission Comments in
Annotations) (1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.405 (West 1963) (amended by 1984
Minn. Laws, c. 628, art. 3, § 11; 1986 Minn. Laws, c. 444; repealed by 1987 Minn.
Laws, c. 10, § 1).
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105 (Criminal Law Commission Comments in An-
notations) (1996).
11. See id.
1997] 289
3
Reger: Montana's Criminal Syndicalism Statute
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1997
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
addresses the growing militia movement and Montana
prosecutors' use of criminal syndicalism laws to convict those
who have threatened public officials. Part IV analyzes Montana's
criminal syndicalism statute in light of United States Supreme
Court authority and discusses proposed changes to this law.
Finally, Part V of this note concludes that the present form of
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute is facially overbroad and
thus unconstitutional.
II. THE RED SCARE, CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM, AND THE EARLY
"CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" STANDARD
There is a long history of governmental and public repres-
sion of dissident groups within the United States. The post
World War I environment, especially after the Bolshevik Revo-
lution, provided the initial impetus for the adoption of criminal
syndicalism statutes. 2 Faced with anti-war movements and the
Red Scare, legislators rushed to quash the advocacy efforts of
dissident groups. 3 Over the next several decades, the United
States Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of these
reactionary statutes. In so doing, the Court developed a signifi-
cant body of First Amendment jurisprudence and articulated the
"clear and present danger" standard.
A. The Old "Threat". The Red Scare of the 1920s
Criminal syndicalism statutes are a phenomenon of the
early twentieth century. 4 These statutes were adopted, in part,
to target an organization called the Industrial Workers of the
World (I.W.W.),'5 a radical relative of the Socialist Party." Al-
though both organizations were devoted to overthrowing the
capitalist system, the I.W.W. believed that overthrow could only
be achieved by direct action. 7 The Socialist Party, on the other
hand, believed that political action would eventually result in the
emancipation of the working class. 8 The I.W.W.'s "direct action"
12. See Eldridge F. Dowell, A History of Criminal Syndicalism Legislation in
the United States, THE JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STuDIES IN HISTORICAL AND PO-
LITICAL SCIENCE, Series LVII, Number 1, at 13-14 (1939).
13. See id.
14. See id. at 49.
15. See id. at 24-25.
16. See JERRY W. CALVERT, THE GIBRALTAR: SOCIALISM AND LABOR IN BuTTE,
MONTANA, 1895-1920, at 7, 50 (1988).
17. See id. at 7.
18. See id.
290 [Vol. 58
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platform included organizing local unions, strikes, boycotts, and
sabotage attempts. 9 Once America entered World War I,
I.W.W. members expanded their idea of direct action to include
anti-war activities such as slow-downs and resistance to the
draft."0
The I.W.W.'s anti-war activities sparked a storm of legisla-
tive reaction.21 Between 1917 and 1919, twenty-three states
adopted statutes creating the new crime of criminal
syndicalism,22 defined as the "doctrine which advocate[s] crime,
sabotage, violence, or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a
means of accomplishing industrial or political reform."
23
While criminal syndicalism statutes led to many convictions
in the 1920s, 24 some believed there was little justification for
the restrictions on personal liberty these laws imposed.25 For
example, the traditional criminal law of the states not only pro-
scribed actual acts of violence against life, property, and govern-
ment, but also conspiracy to commit those acts.26 Because of
these existing laws, criminal syndicalism statutes, at best, over-
lapped traditional conspiracy law. 27 Some commentators criti-
cized criminal syndicalism statutes for criminalizing the mere
advocacy or suggestion of change to the existing social-economic
19. See id. at 10.
20. See Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:
The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653, 654
(1988) (citing R. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA 29-30 (1955)).
21. See id. at 654-55.
22. See Woodrow C. Whitten, Criminal Syndicalism and the Law in California:
1919-1927, TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY SOCIETY, March 1969, at 3-
4, 65; Dowell, supra note 12, at 147 (noting that, by 1937, the following states and
territories had enacted criminal syndicalism laws: Alaska, c. 6 (1919); Ariz., c. 13
(ext. sess. 1918) (repealed in 1928); Cal., c. 188 (1919); Colo., c. 1 (ext. sess. 1919);
Haw., Act 186 (1919); Idaho, c. 145 (1917), c. 136 (1919), c. 51 (1925); Ind., c. 125
(1919); Iowa, c. 382 (1919); Kan., c. 37 (ext. sess. 1920); Ky., c. 100 (1920), c. 20
(1922); Mich., Act 255 (1919) (reenacted by Act 328 (1931)); Minn., c. 215 (1917);
Mont., c. 7 (ext. sess. 1918); Neb., c. 261 (1919); Nev., c. 22 (1919); Ohio Laws,
CVIII, Pt. 1, p. 189 (1919); Okla., c. 70 (1919); Or., c. 12 (1919), c. 34 (1921) (re-
pealed in 1937); S.D., c. 38 (ext. sess. 1918); Utah, c. 127 (1919); Wash., c. 3 (1919)
(replaced by c. 174 (1919) (repealed in 1937)); W. Va., c. 24, § 1 (1919); Wyo., c. 76
(1919)).
23. Whitten, supra note 22, (citing Idaho, c. 145 (1917)).
24. See id. at 64 (citing LEE TULIN, DIGEST OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
SYNDICALISM CASES 72 (1926) (unpublished report of the Secretary of the California
Branch of the General Defense Committee of the I.W.W., San Francisco) (noting that
in California, from 1919 to 1926, some 164 people were convicted under that state's
criminal syndicalism statute).
25. See Whitten, supra note 22, at 63.
26. See Dowell, supra note 12, at 144.
27. See id.
1997] 291
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structure, thus hindering the free flow of ideas that the First
Amendment was designed to safeguard. 28 A classic example of
the abuse of criminal syndicalism and related statutes occurred
in Butte, Montana, in 1918.29 Federal troops in Butte, acting
under the color of these statutes, arrested groups of I.W.W.
members in order to prevent them from organizing labor workers
for strikes and related activities.0
B. The Early "Clear and Present Danger" Standard
In 1919, a unanimous Court in Schenck v. United States
31
examined the restrictions that criminal syndicalism and similar
statutes imposed upon First Amendment freedoms." Schenck
articulated the "clear and present danger" test for determining
whether governmental interference with the First Amendment
was constitutional. 33 Under this test, government could consti-
tutionally infringe upon First Amendment freedoms if the pro-
hibited speech created a clear and present danger of bringing
about "the substantive evils that Congress [had] a right to pre-
vent."34 The Supreme Court followed and clarified this standard
in subsequent opinions.'
A later Supreme Court decision, Whitney v. California,38
indicated that the clear and present danger standard was not
necessarily a stringent one. In the early 1920s, a social activist
named Charlotte Anita Whitney was arrested for attending a
meeting of the Communist Party37  and charged under
California's criminal syndicalism statute.38 According to investi-
gating officers, Ms. Whitney had no interest in unlawful activity
or governmental overthrow.39 In fact, during the course of her
28. See id. at 145.
29. See CALVERT, supra note 16, at 112.
30. See id. at 113-14.
31. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
32. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925) (stating that "ut-
terances advocating the overthrow of organized goverinment by force, violence and
unlawful means are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of
substantive evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of. .. police power (cita-
tion omitted)).
36. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
37. See Blasi, supra note 20, at 657.
38. See id.; see also 1919 Cal. Stat. 199, c. 188.
39. See Blasi, supra note 20, at 657 (citing The Pardon of Anita Whitney, THE
292 [Vol. 58
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trial, Ms. Whitney testified that while she was a member of the
Communist Labor Party, "it was not her intention that [the Par-
ty] should be an instrument for terrorism or violence."4 ° Despite
her testimony, Charlotte Whitney was found guilty of criminal
syndicalism and sentenced to up to fourteen years in prison.41
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed Ms.
Whitney's conviction, finding California's criminal syndicalism
statute constitutional.42 The Court reasoned that advocating
violent political change presented such a danger to the State
that it could be outlawed.' However, Justice Brandeis, concur-
ring, stated that First Amendment freedoms were critical to a
free society and that "[t]o justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced."" Brandeis' defense of free speech fore-
shadowed further developments in First Amendment jurispru-
dence.
The United States Supreme Court continued to provide for
the protection of free speech after Whitney. In De Jonge v. Ore-
gon, a unanimous Court found that Oregon's criminal
syndicalism statute" was unconstitutional." The Court held
that the statute's overbroad wording unconstitutionally infringed
upon freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, encompass-
ing both protected and unprotected methods of speech and as-
sembly.47
After De Jonge, other United States Supreme Court deci-
sions continued to increase the level of protection for First
Amendment freedoms." The Court began distinguishing be-
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 10, 1927, at 310-11 (quoting Oakland Chief of Police Walter
Peterson, a strong supporter of syndicalism laws, who stated:
I investigated Anita Whitney's record in 1919. 1 found that she had always
done an enormous amount of good in the community. I wasn't in sympathy
with her pacifistic ideas and a lot of her other notions. But I recognized
that it wasn't in her nature to commit violence nor to encourage it. She
was one of those idealists who want to make the world better for every-
one)).
40. Whitten, supra note 22, at 47.
41. See id. (cilation omitted).
42. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 357.
43. See id. at 371-72.
44. Id. at 376-77, (Brandeis, J., concurring).
45. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 14-3,110 to -3,112, amended by Act of Mar. 15, 1933,
c. 459, 1933 Or. Laws 868-69 (1933).
46. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
47. See De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 363.
48. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 438 (1963) (commenting on
the baneful effect of criminal sanctions upon First Amendment rights, stating that
1997] 293
7
Reger: Montana's Criminal Syndicalism Statute
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1997
294 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
tween advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at
producing unlawful action.49 In two cases, Noto v. United
States ° and Yates v. United States,5 the Court found that the
First Amendment protected advocating governmental overthrow
by force, as long as the advocacy was remote from concrete ac-
tion.52 In 1968, the O'Brien Court created a four-part test to
determine whether governmental infringement upon First
Amendment freedoms was constitutionally acceptable in cases
involving a mixture of conduct and expression.53 The trend to-
ward increasing protection for freedom of speech continues in the
wake of De Jonge, Noto, Yates, and O'Brien.
Other important developments in First Amendment jurispru-
dence concerned the freedom of assembly, especially the role that
assembly played in speech.' The Supreme Court recognized
even the threat of criminal sanctions may deter the exercise of those rights and
noting the "danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the exis-
tence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application." Id. The
case also states that "[i]f there is an internal tension between proscription and pro-
tection in a statute, we cannot assume that, in its subsequent enforcement, ambigu-
ities will be resolved in favor of adequate protection of First Amendment rights." Id.
at 437); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (noting the usual presump-
tion favoring statutes was balanced by the Court's overriding concern with protecting
First Amendment freedoms); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (not-
ing that statutes infringing upon speech were unconstitutional if overbroad, "sweeping
in a great variety of conduct under a general and indefinite characterization, and
leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in [their] applica-
tion." Id.).
49. See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S. at 438; Note v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 296-
98 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318, 321-22 (1957); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 505, 509-10 (1951); Thomas, 323 U.S. at 529-30; Cantwell, 310
U.S. at 308; De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 365; Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377-79 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
50. 367 U.S. 290 (1960).
51. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
52. See Noto, 367 U.S. at 297-98; Yates, 354 U.S. at 321-22.
53. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
54. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982)
(recognizing that "[t]he right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection
merely because some members of the group may have participated in conduct or
advocated doctrine that itself is not protected"); Citizens Against Rent Con-
trol/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley California, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981)
(emphasizing the importance of freedom of assembly by stating "[wie begin by recall-
ing that the practice of persons sharing common views banding together to achieve a
common end is deeply embedded in the American political process"); Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972) (holding that the Constitution's protection is not limited to
direct interference with fundamental rights and courts are not free to disregard the
practical realities of that interference). The Court noted that, in order to constitution-
ally infringe upon the freedom of assembly, "government has the burden of establish-
ing a knowing affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims and goals,
and a specific intent to further those illegal aims." Id. at 186.; see Noto, 367 U.S. at
8
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that free association made the advocacy of a group's point of
view possible (especially the more controversial the idea)55 and
that government must have a compelling interest before infring-
ing upon freedom of assembly.55 The Court also concluded that
the First Amendment includes the right to express one's beliefs
by disseminating printed materials. 7 In Associated Press v.
United States, the Court stated that "[fireedom to publish means
freedom for all and not for some.""
III. MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE RISE OF THE MILITIA MOVEMENT
After the "Red Scare" passed, criminal syndicalism statutes
were rarely used.59 However, while these statutes lay dormant.
First Amendment jurisprudence continued to evolve, developing
more stringent standards than the clear and present danger test.
A. The Modern "Incitement to Imminent and Likely Unlawful
Action" Standard
In 1969, the Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion in
First Amendment jurisprudence. In Brandenburg v. Ohio,6' a
unanimous Court struck down the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
298 (stating that, for a group to be punished for inciting unlawful acts, the acts
complained of must "fairly be imputed to the [whole group], and not merely to some
narrow segment of it."); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1958) (noting that effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, par-
ticularly controversial ones, is enhanced by group association and that whether a
group's beliefs are political, economic, religious, or cultural in nature is immaterial
and that governmental restrictions on the freedom to associate, even if incidental and
unintended, are subject to stringent scrutiny).
55. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-61.
56. See Button, 371 U.S. at 438.
57. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67, 70 (1964) (limiting state
power to impose criminal sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public offi-
cials and noting that the criminal law is usually reserved for behavior that excep-
tionally disturbs the community); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266-67
(1964) (noting that, even though someone is not a member of the press per se, that
person still has the right to have his ideas printed and disseminated to the public,
otherwise "[tihe effect would be to shackle the First Amendment in its attempt to
secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources" (citation omitted)).
58. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
59. Interview with William F. Crowley, Professor of Law, University of Montana
School of Law, Missoula, Mont. (Sept. 23, 1996) (noting that, until 1995, no one had
ever been convicted of criminal syndicalism in Montana).
60. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
9
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Act61 as unconstitutionally overbroad. Ohio's Criminal
Syndicalism Act prohibited "advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity,
or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform," as well as "assembl[ing] with any society, group, or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines
of criminal syndicalism." 2 The Brandenburg Court found this
statute unconstitutional, noting that:
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed
towards inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action.'
The Court further stated that a statute which failed to draw a
distinction between advocacy and "preparing a group for violent
action and steeling it to such action" was unconstitutional in
light of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Finally, the
Brandenburg Court replaced the clear and present danger stan-
dard with the "direct incitement" test, thereby overruling the
Whitney decision.65
B. The New "Threat". The Rise of Militias
Today, a growing number of Americans feel their constitu-
tional liberties are threatened by a vast federal government.66
Some of these individuals seek to challenge what they see as an
abuse of governmental power by forming militia groups.67 The
militia movement's philosophy of challenging the government
has been linked to several violent incidents, including the Okla-
homa City bombing, which brought national attention to the
movement. 8 Despite militia members' denials of involvement in
such acts against the government, state and federal legislatures
have passed laws attempting to neutralize these groups.69
61. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (repealed 1972).
62. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (repealed 1972).
63. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
64. Id. at 448-49 (quoting Noto, 367 U.S. at 297-98 (1961)).
65. See id. at 449.
66. See R.J. Larizza, Comment, Paranoia, Patriotism, and the Citizen Militia
Movement: Constitutional Right or Criminal Conduct?, 47 MERCER L. REV. 581 (1996).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 581-82.
69. See id. at 582-83.
[Vol. 58296
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Some of these laws may infringe upon freedom of speech and
other constitutional rights.70 Additionally, these laws may fuel
militia fears, as one of the militia's goals is to resist government
encroachment upon their constitutional rights. Commentary on
legislative efforts to control these groups exemplifies this effect.
For example, militia activist J.J. Johnson stated that "the only
thing standing between some of the current legislation being
contemplated and armed conflict is time."7 Despite the push for
legislation regulating militia activities, some prosecutors are
using criminal syndicalism statutes in an attempt to punish
those who would merely advocate using unlawful activity to
overthrow government.
1. Militia Activity and Recent Applications of the Criminal
Syndicalism Statute in Montana
Montana Militia members have recently been convicted of
criminal syndicalism under section 45-8-105, sparking concern
over the statute's constitutionality. In two separate actions, the
State of Montana charged Francis Joe Holland, the self-pro-
claimed leader of the North American Volunteer Militia, and
Calvin Greenup, the Montana Coordinator of the North Ameri-
can Volunteer Militia, with criminal syndicalism under section
45-8-105 of the Montana Code.
Both prosecutions arose from the same series of events. In
1994, a letter printed on North American Militia stationary and
allegedly signed by Holland was mailed to various state and local
officials in Montana.73 This message stated that the purpose of
the Militia was to "defend our inhabitants against an out of
control government and their hordes of officers that have been
70. See Joelle E. Polesky, Comment, The Rise of Private Militia: A First and
Second Amendment Analysis of the Right to Organize and the Right to Train, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1593 (1996) (discussing the impact of recent anti-militia legislation upon
the Second Amendment and arguing that while the right to organize a militia enjoys
constitutional protection, the right to paramilitary training does not).
71. Larizza, supra note 66, at 590 (quoting The Militia Movement in the United
States, 1995, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Govern-
ment Information of the Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 103,
(1995) (statement of J.J. Johnson, Ohio Unorganized Militia)).
72. See Amd. Information at 1, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st Dist. Ct.
Mont. filed June 26, 1995); Information at 1, State v. Greenup, No. CR-95-52 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed May 2, 1995).
73. See Aff. in Supp. of Mot. for Leave to File Am. Information at 2, State v.
Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st Dist. Ct. Mont. filed June 21, 1995).
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sent forth to harass our people."74 Furthermore, this letter con-
tained a number of threatening statements, such as the following
passage:
We would prefer that you take a good hard look at what you
and your agencies are doing and amend your ways immediate-
ly. We are prepared, however, to defend, with our life, our
Rights to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. We num-
ber in the thousands in your area and everywhere else. How
many of your agents will be sent home in body bags before you
hear the pleas of the people?75
Assistant Attorney General John Connor, Jr., sent Holland a
letter on January 17, 1995, advising Holland that the threaten-
ing tone of his letter may constitute a violation of several Mon-
tana criminal statutes.76 Despite this warning, a press release
bearing Holland's name as National Director of the North Ameri-
can Militia was mailed in early February 1995, referring to a
corrupt judicial system and encouraging readers to contact Cal-
vin Greenup for further details.77
Approximately one month later, Holland issued another
press release in Montana, claiming that he was prepared to "call
out approximately one million militia members to protect the
patriots and good people of Ravalli County."78 This release
urged readers to contact Calvin Greenup and "let him know that
you intend to stay on top of this situation."79 In April, 1995, an-
other press release bearing Holland's name as "National Direc-
tor" was distributed throughout Montana, urging interested
Militia members to call and pledge their help "against the ty-
rants that seek their, and your, destruction ... ."'0 These press
releases all contained the name of Calvin Greenup as Montana
State Coordinator of the North American Volunteer Militia."
In response, several undercover Montana Criminal Investi-
gation Bureau agents contacted Greenup and obtained informa-
tion about possible planned actions.82 During the course of a
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 3.
77. See id.
78. Aff. in Supp. of Mot. to File Am. Information at 3-4, State v. Holland, No.
CR-95-53 (21st Dist. Ct. Mont. filed June 21, 1995).
79. Id. at 4.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 4-5.
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telephone conversation, an individual claiming to be Greenup
told the agents that they should come to Ravalli County and be
prepared to arrest public officials, including judges, attorneys,
and the sheriff, for violating the Constitution." These individu-
als would, after arrest, be immediately tried in a "Common Law
Court" and, if found guilty, hanged for treason." The agents
were also instructed to bring firearms, both for long-range and
close-quarters work.8"
Several days later, the agents met with Greenup in per-
son.8 During the course of this encounter, Greenup told the
agents that the militia must first impose common law in Hamil-
ton, immediately hang all people guilty of treason, and then
continue to enforce their law throughout the state.87 The agents
observed many weapons, gas masks and crates of ammunition
during their meeting with Greenup and were also instructed to
kill any law enforcement officers that they saw." Apparently,
these agents were the only people who responded to the "nation-
al" press releases. 9
Greenup and Holland were charged with criminal
syndicalism pursuant to section 45-8-105 of the Montana
Code. 0 In response, both asserted that Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute is facially overbroad and, therefore, unconsti-
tutional.' The State asserted that section 45-8-105 can be in-
terpreted in a constitutional manner and, thus, is not facially
unconstitutional for overbreadth 2 The State argued that courts
must presume that statutes are constitutional and construe
those laws narrowly to avoid such conflicts if possible. Fur-
83. See Aff. in Supp. of Mot. to File Am. Information at 5, State v. Holland,
No. CR-95-53 (21st Dist. Ct. Mont. filed June 21, 1995).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 6.
87. See id. at 7.
88. See Aff. in Supp. of Mot. to File Am. Information at 6-7, State v. Holland,
No. CR-95-53 (21st Dist. Ct. Mont. filed June 21, 1995).
89. See John Connor, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Address at James R.
Browning Symposium, University of Montana School of Law (Oct. 4-5, 1996).
90. See Amd. Information at 1, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st Dist. Ct.
Mont. filed June 26, 1995); Information at 1, State v. Greenup, No. CR-95-52 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed May 2, 1995).
91. See Brief in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 10, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53
(21st Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Sept 29, 1995) (motion denied by Judge Harkin on Nov. 8,
1995); Information at 1, State v. Greenup, No. CR-95-52 (21st Dist. Ct. Mont. filed
May 2, 1995).
92. See Response to Mot. to Dismiss at 7, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Oct. 17, 1995).
93. See id. at 6 (citing State v. Lilburn, 265 Mont. 266, 875 P.2d 1036, 1041
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thermore, the State claimed that any unenforceable portion of
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute is "arguably severable
from the remainder."94 The State also asserted that any consti-
tutional problems with the statute could be cured by proper jury
instructions.95
The State also emphasized that Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute has the legitimate purpose of prohibiting
advocacy which leads to crime.96 The State claimed that this
statute does not punish speech or advocacy, but rather the illegal
conduct that results from that speech.97 However, the State
conceded that a statute which has constitutional problems can be
invalidated if (1) the statute is overbroad and (2) that over-
breadth is real and substantial, as reviewed in regard to its
purpose.9"
The Honorable Douglas G. Harkin, District Judge for the
Montana Fourth Judicial District, denied Holland's and
Greenup's motions to dismiss based on the statute's over-
breadth.99  Judge Harkin noted that "Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute was enacted long before the Court decided
Brandenburg and, consequently, the Montana legislature did not
have the benefit of [that test] for constitutionality."' The court
failed to recognize, however, that section 45-8-105 was enacted
four years after Brandenburg.'0 ' Furthermore, Judge Harkin
agreed with the State that any constitutional difficulty with
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute could be cured by requir-
(1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 726 (1995) (citations omitted)).
94. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Board of Natu-
ral Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. Lance, 222 Mont. 92,
721 P.2d 1258 (1986); Gullickson v. Mitchell, 113 Mont. 359, 126 P.2d 1106 (1942)).
95. See id. at 8 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992);
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975); Wurtz v. Risley, 719
F.2d 1438, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1983)).
96. See id.
97. See Response to Mot. to Dismiss at 8-9, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53
(21st Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Oct. 17, 1995).
98. See id. at 8 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1973);
State v. Ross, 269 Mont. 347, 353, 889 P.2d 161, 164 (1995); State v. Lilburn, 265
Mont. 258, 265, 875 P.2d 1036, 1040 (1984)).
99. See Memorandum and Order at 17, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Nov. 8, 1995) (denying Holland's Motion to Dismiss); John
Connor, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Address at James R. Browning Symposium,
University of Montana School of Law (Oct. 4-5, 1996).
100. Memorandum and Order at 14, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st Dist.
Ct. Mont. filed Nov. 8, 1995) (denying Holland's Motion to Dismiss).
101. Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), with MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-8-105 Official Comments (1973).
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ing jury instructions on constitutionally protected speech.1"2
IV. ANALYSIS: MONTANA'S CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM STATUTE
Because Montana's criminal syndicalism statute affects First
Amendment rights of speech, the press, and assembly, section
45-8-105 should be considered in light of established First
Amendment jurisprudence. Since the First Amendment confers
fundamental rights, courts allow facial challenges to statutes
that impact expression."lw In fact, even persons charged with
constitutionally prohibited conduct may challenge statutes that,
on their face, substantially infringe upon protected speech. 1 '
Essentially, a facial challenge will invalidate a statute if the
statutory language is unconstitutionally overbroad, and no nar-
rowing construction is apparent.0 5 If a facial challenge to a
statute is successful, that statute may not be enforced under any
circumstances until it has been appropriately narrowed."°
A. Overbreadth Under Brandenburg
Under Brandenburg, a State may not proscribe advocacy of
unlawful action unless such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to do so."°7
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute fails to meet the require-
ments of Brandenburg. First, section 45-8-105's language is al-
most as overbroad as Ohio's unconstitutional criminal
syndicalism statute. Second, the statute does not have a purpose
that extends beyond the traditional criminal law in a constitu-
tionally acceptable manner. Finally, Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute does not meet Brandenburg's mental culpa-
bility requirements.
Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act was remarkably similar to
102. See Memorandum and Order at 16, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Nov. 8, 1995) (denying Holland's Motion to Dismiss).
103. See Anthony M. Barlow, The First Amendment Protection of Free Press and
Expression-State Licensing Laws for Newspaper Vending Machines: City of Lakewood
v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988), 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 287
(1989).
104. See John A. Grafton, Comment, Hunter Harassment Statutes: Do They Shoot
Holes Into the First Amendment?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 191, 199-200 (1993) (citations
omitted).
105. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J.
853, 863 (1991).
106. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46
STAN. L. REV. 235 (1994).
107. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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section 45-8-105 of the Montana Code.'0 8 Both statutes pro-
scribe the advocacy of crime, violence, or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform. 9 Both statutes prohibit "assembling with any society
or group formed to advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism." "' While the Montana statute is not so broad as
to expressly prohibit teaching criminal syndicalism, as Ohio's
statute did, section 45-8-105 nonetheless fails to differentiate be-
tween advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action.
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute prohibits advocating or
promoting malicious damage to property as a means of accom-
plishing political ends."' Therefore, standing on a street corner
and announcing that everyone in Missoula should deface the
city's parking meters because the rates are too high would sub-
ject the speaker to potential criminal charges."' This failure to
distinguish advocacy from incitement is sufficient to make
Montana's criminal syndicalism law overbroad, and hence, un-
constitutional under Brandenburg.
In the Greenup and Holland cases, the State successfully
argued that Montana's criminal syndicalism statute could be
applied constitutionally."' The State argued that statutory in-
terpretation rules required courts to presume statutes are consti-
tutional and to construe them narrowly to accomplish this pur-
pose."4 However, this argument is flawed.
The State concedes that a statute which has constitutional
108. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (repealed 1972) provided:
Sec. 13421-23. Criminal syndicalism defined. That criminal syndicalism is
the doctrine which advocates crime, sabotage, which is defined as the mali-
cious injury or destruction of the property of another, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform. The advocacy of such doctrine, whether by word of mouth or writ-
ing, is a felony, punishable as is in this act.
109. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.12 (repealed 1972); see MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-8-105(1) (1995).
110. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (repealed 1972); see MONT. CODE ANN. §
45-8-105(2)(b) (1995).
111. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105(1), (2)(a) (1996).
112. See John Smith, Attorney for Calvin K. Greenup, Address at James R.
Browning Symposium, University of Montana School of Law (Oct. 4-5, 1996).
113. See Memorandum and Order at 17, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st
Judicial Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Nov. 8, 1995) (denying Holland's Mot. to Dismiss); Com-
ments of John Connor, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, at Symposium, The Militia:
Constitutional and Criminal Law Perspectives, University of Montana School of Law
(Oct. 4-5, 1996).
114. See Response to Mot. to Dismiss at 6, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st
Judicial Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 17, 1995).
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applications can be invalidated if the law is overbroad and that
overbreadth is real and substantial, in regard to the statute's
purpose." 5  According to the State, Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute has the "legitimate purpose of prohibiting
advocacy which leads to crime" and "punishing the unlawful acts
resulting from that speech."" 6 However, those unlawful acts
could be punished with a variety of conventional means, such as
theft,1' 7  robbery," 8  arson," 9  and deliberate homicide 2 °
statutes. Furthermore, even if Montana's criminal syndicalism
statute has the legitimate purpose of prohibiting advocacy which
leads to crime, a variety of statutes are already on the books
which can constitutionally accomplish this function, such as
intimidation, 2' conspiracy,"' and attempt 23  statutes. For
example, Greenup's plan to impose "common law justice" in
Ravalli County, when viewed in light of the facts that he was
stockpiling munitions and summoning people to aid him could be
viewed as an attempt to commit intimidation.' 4 However, As-
sistant Attorney General John Connor stated that, due to proof
problems, the only viable means of charging Greenup and Hol-
land was under Montana's criminal syndicalism statute.' 25
115. See Response to Mot. to Dismiss at 8, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Oct. 17, 1995).
116. Response to Mot. to Dismiss at 8-9, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53, (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Oct. 17, 1995).
117. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-301 (1995).
118. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-401 (1995).
119. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-103 (1995).
120. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1995).
121. Montana's intimidation statute, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-203 (1995), with-
stood constitutional challenge in State v. Cleland, 246 Mont. 165, 803 P.2d 1093
(1995).
122. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-102 (1995).
123. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (1995).
124. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-203 (1995), which provides in relevant part:
(1) A person commits the offense of intimidation when, with the purpose to
cause another to perform, or omit the performance of any act, he communi-
cates to another, under circumstances which reasonably tend to produce a
fear that it will be carried out, a threat to perform without lawful authority
any of the following acts:
(a) inflict physical harm on the person threatened or any other
person;
(b) subject any person to physical confinement or restraint; or
(c) commit any felony.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-4-103 (1995) provides in relevant part:
(1) A person commits the offense of attempt when, with the purpose to
commit a specific offense, he does any act toward the commission of such
offense.
125. See John Connor, Jr., Address at James R. Browning Symposium, Universi-
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Another significant constitutional difficulty with section 45-
8-105 is the statute's failure to meet the mental culpability re-
quirements of Brandenburg. Specifically, Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute proscribes a broader spectrum of conduct
than permitted by Brandenburg."6  Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute prohibits purposeful and knowing con-
duct.127 In Montana, "a person acts purposely with respect
to . . . conduct described by a statute ... if it is the person's
conscious object to engage in that conduct."'28 Brandenburg re-
quires that incitement be directed to producing imminent and
likely lawless action, so the mental state of "purposely" in Mon-
tana meets this standard. 29 However, in Montana, "a person
acts knowingly with respect to conduct ... described by a statute
defining an offense when the person is aware of his conduct."3 °
Furthermore, "[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if
a person is aware of a high probability of its existence."'' This
level of mental culpability is significantly lower than the delib-
erateness required under Brandenburg.'32
For example, under Montana's criminal syndicalism statute,
one could not advocate an inflammatory position in front of a
crowd where there may be a high probability that someone
would react with lawless conduct.'33 This would be true wheth-
er the speaker intended to incite lawless action or whether the
crowd itself was hostile and where the speaker was advocating
an extremely unpopular position. For example, consider a mili-
tant anti-abortion activist engaged in fiery rhetoric in front of a
crowd that contained pro-choice activists who would likely react
with violence. Montana's criminal syndicalism statute could be
applied in this situation because it prohibits persons from know-
ingly promoting violence as a political solution. Because the
speaker in this example "agitated" the crowd into violence, re-
gardless of the fact that it would most likely be violence against
him or her, that individual could face criminal liability under
section 45-8-105. Allowing, the risk of an unlawful result to satis-
ty of Montana School of Law (Oct. 4-5 1996).
126. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
127. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105(2) (1995).
128. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(63) (1995).
129. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
130. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(34) (1995).
131. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(34) (1995).
132. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
133. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105(1), (2)(a) (1995).
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fy the mental state element of criminal syndicalism effectively
chills free speech because it forces speakers to tiptoe around
volatile issues to avoid the unlawful actions of others. This fails
to meet the direct incitement required for governmental restric-
tions on speech in Brandenburg.
B. Severance is an Inadequate Remedy
Courts consider free speech to be of the utmost importance.
Free expression is critical to a democratic society because it is
indispensable to free thought and to the "discovery and spread of
political truth."" The First Amendment's guarantee of free ex-
pression "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
is essential to the welfare of the public."135 This ensures the
value of the marketplace of ideas because it provides for rigorous
debate between conflicting views."3 Indeed, free speech is the
heart of a democratic society." 7 Therefore, the usual presump-
tion favoring statutes is balanced by the overriding concern for
protecting First Amendment freedoms.138
In the Greenup and Holland cases, the State maintained
that any invalid portion of Montana's criminal syndicalism stat-
ute is "arguably severable from the remainder.""9 This asser-
tion fails to recognize that the entire statute depends on the
definition of "criminal syndicalism" contained within subsection
one." Because this subsection fails to differentiate between
mere advocacy and incitement to imminent and likely lawless ac-
tion, it is not only an unconstitutional intrusion on First Amend-
ment freedoms by itself, but it also taints the rest of the stat-
ute.'" Even assuming that the entire definitions section, 45-8-
105(1), could be severed and replaced with the Brandenburg
standard, other portions of Montana's criminal syndicalism stat-
ute are also unconstitutional. Specifically, section 45-8-105 in-
fringes upon the freedom of the press and the freedom of associa-
134. Id.
135. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
136. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
137. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 151 (1939).
138. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (citations omitted).
139. Response to Mot. to Dismiss at 7, n.1, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Oct. 17, 1995).
140. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105 (1995).
141. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105 (1995).
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tion.
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute prohibits the distri-
bution, sale, publishing, or public display of any writing advocat-
ing or advertising the doctrine of criminal syndicalism, whether
"for or on behalf of another whose purpose is to advocate or pro-
mote the doctrine of criminal syndicalism."' However, even
persons who are not members of the press have the right to
disseminate their views in written materials." Otherwise, the
First Amendment would be "shackled in its attempt to secure
'the widest dissemination of information from diverse and antag-
onistic sources.""" Montana's criminal syndicalism statute in-
trudes upon the freedom of the press by forbidding the mere
advertising of "criminal syndicalism" meetings, as well as the
dissemination of any written materials which merely advocate
the doctrine. However, this is not the end of section 45-8-105's
constitutional difficulties.
The freedom to associate is indispensable to a free "market-
place of ideas" because it gives individuals a realistic opportunity
to make their views known through group action when, "individ-
ually, their voices would be faint or lost."" The Constitution
gives individuals the right to associate for political, economic,
religious, or cultural purposes." Thus, governmental restric-
tions on the freedom to associate, even those that are incidental
or unintended, are subject to strict scrutiny.1
47
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute contains several
provisions which violate an individual's freedom of assembly.
Section 45-8-105(2)(b) criminalizes organizing or becoming a
member "of any assembly, group, or organization which one
knows is advocating or promoting the doctrine of criminal
syndicalism."'" This provision fails the strict scrutiny test be-
cause even if necessary to further a compelling governmental
interest, it still fails to differentiate between members pursuing
legitimate and illegal goals. Furthermore, Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute prohibits one who is either "the owner or in
possession or control of any premises, [from] knowingly
permitt[ing] any assemblage of persons to use such premises for
142. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105(2)(c) (1995).
143. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266-67 (1964).
144. Id. (citing Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20).
145. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous., 454 U.S. at 294.
146. See Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
147. See id. at 460-61.
148. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105(2)(b) (1995).
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the purposes of advocating or promoting the doctrine of criminal
syndicalism." "9 This provision conflicts with the freedom of as-
sociation in the same manner as subsection (2Xb) because it fails
to differentiate between owners who allow their property to be
used for legitimate purposes, like advocacy of unlawful action,
from those who allow their property to be used for illegal purpos-
es, like incitement to unlawful action. Finally, Montana's crimi-
nal syndicalism statute violates the freedom of association be-
cause it forbids "distribut[ing], sell[ing], publish[ing], or publicly
display[ing] any writing advocating or advertising" criminal
syndicalism, regardless of the extent of one's association with a
group adhering to that doctrine. 5 °
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute is in direct conflict
with existing law because it would punish all members of an
organization regardless of whether they engaged in unlawful
activity.'5 ' In 1961, the United States Supreme Court estab-
lished that, in order to punish a group for unlawful acts, the
offending behavior must be fairly attributable to the entire
group, rather than some portion of it.'5 ' In order to prosecute
an individual who assembles with others, the government must
show that (1) the individual knowingly affiliated with a group
possessing illegal aims and (2) the individual intended to further
those illegal aims.'53 In 1982, the Supreme Court held that
"[t]he right to associate does not lose all constitutional protection
merely because some members of [a] group may have participat-
ed in conduct or advocated doctrine that is itself not protect-
ed.-1
Under Montana's present criminal syndicalism statute, all
who organize, become members of, or attend meetings of groups
that advocate unlawful action for purposes of industrial or politi-
cal change could be charged with criminal syndicalism under
section 45-8-105. In the militia context, this means that mem-
bers assembling only for political action would be punished along
with those more radical members who support acts of terrorism.
Consider a group of militia members, some who wish to sum-
marily execute various state officials, others who wish to save
their farms from foreclosure by joining together for political
149. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105(4) (1995).
150. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105(2)(c) (1995).
151. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-105(2)(b) (1995).
152. See Noto, 367 U.S. at 298.
153. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 183.
154. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 908.
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action. All could be punished under Montana's criminal
syndicalism law, whether they joined the militia movement to
indulge in violence or to achieve a higher political purpose. Sec-
tion 45-8-105's failure to address the criminal intentions of those
it would punish represents a patent violation of the First
Amendment's freedom of association.
Montana's criminal syndicalism statute infringes on a vari-
ety of First Amendment freedoms. Not only does the statute fail
to differentiate advocacy from incitement, but it also would pro-
hibit a broad spectrum of associational behaviors by failing to
differentiate between those group members engaging in legal
activities and those engaging in illegal behaviors. Section 45-8-
105 also constrains the freedom of the press because it places a
blanket prohibition on disseminating materials advocating or
even advertising the doctrine of criminal syndicalism without re-
gard to the criminal intent of the individual, much less the sub-
stantive contents of the materials themselves. These constitu-
tional problems are so pervasive in Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute that severance is an inadequate remedy.
C. Jury Instruction is an Inadequate Remedy
In the Holland and Greenup cases, the trial court stated
that proper jury instructions can cure constitutional problems
with Montana's criminal syndicalism statute.'55 However, jury
instructions cannot prevent law enforcement from using this
statute against those who merely advocate unlawful overthrow of
the government. This potential use by law enforcement chills
free speech because the threat of being arrested deters people
from expressing their view.156
The United States Supreme Court recognizes the profound
danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment rights, a
penal statute susceptible to abuse. 57 Even the threat of crimi-
nal sanctions may deter the exercise of constitutional freedoms
as much as actual sanctions.'58 The Brandenburg standard
does not tolerate convicting persons merely advocating lawless
155. See Memorandum and Order at 16, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Nov. 8, 1995) (denying Holland's Mot. to Dismiss); John Connor,
Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Address at James R. Browning Symposium, Universi-
ty of Montana School of Law (Oct. 4-5, 1996).
156. See Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
157. See id.
158. See id.
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action, but those persons could still be arrested under Montana's
present criminal syndicalism statute.159 Furthermore, courts
are prohibited from allowing statutes to stand that "affect First
Amendment rights and leave an extreme amount of discretion to
law enforcement and other members of the executive
branch."
160
In the Holland and Greenup cases, the State persuaded the
District Court that the Brandenburg test could be used to inter-
pret and apply Montana's criminal syndicalism statute in a con-
stitutional manner.16' The State argued that a state court's in-
terpretation of a statute was controlling and could "narrow a
statute's application to within constitutional parameters."62
However, while this may prevent convictions, it fails to address
law enforcement's potential use of section 45-8-105 to arrest or
harass mere government dissidents. Jury instructions fail to
adequately address the problem of a statute that allows law
enforcement a general discretion in the area of First Amendment
rights.
The constitutional concerns brought out during the Holland
and Greenup cases prompted a revision of Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute. While the process of revision and drafting
continues, it is evident that the new version of section 45-8-105
will firmly adhere to the Brandenburg standard and prohibit
only direct incitement to imminent and likely lawless action."
The revision will not contain any prohibitions on associational
behaviors and will also be renamed, as the very phrase "criminal
syndicalism" bears the taint of unconstitutionality. These revi-
159. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 183.
160. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
161. See John Connor, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Address at James R.
Browning Symposium, University of Montana School of Law (Oct. 4-5, 1996).
162. See Response to Mot. to Dismiss at 6, State v. Holland, No. CR-95-53 (21st
Dist. Ct. Mont. filed Oct. 17, 1995).
163. Telephone interview with John Connor, Jr., Assistant Attorney General,
State of Montana (Dec. 23, 1996). As of February 28, 1997, the proposed legislation
provides in relevant part:
45-8-105. Criminal Incitement.
(1) A person commits the offense of criminal incitement if the person pur-
posely or knowingly advocates the commission of a criminal offense and the
advocacy:
(a) is directed to inciting or producing imminent unlawful action;
and
(b) is likely to incite or produce unlawful action.
(2) For purposes of this section, "imminent" means highly predictable.
(3) A person convicted of the offense of criminal incitement shall be impris-
oned in the state prison for a term not to exceed 10 years.
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sions should clear up the present constitutional difficulties with
Montana's current criminal syndicalism statute.
V. CONCLUSION
Montana's present criminal syndicalism statute is clearly
unconstitutional on its face. The statute's failure to differentiate
between mere advocacy and incitement to immediate and likely
lawless action criminalizes a broad spectrum of activities, both
constitutionally protected and unprotected. Montana's criminal
syndicalism statute, like many of its counterparts, represents an
impermissible intrusion upon First Amendment principles of
freedom of speech and association, both considered by many
jurists to be the bedrock of American society.
Montana's criminal syndicalism statue must be tailored to
conform to Brandenburg. If one accepts the State's position, then
Greenup and Holland's actions are just the sort that criminal
syndicalism statutes can effectively prohibit. However, because
section 45-8-105 is far too broad in wording and potential appli-
cation, it should be held unconstitutional by the Montana Su-
preme Court. While this failure will reaffirm the notion that
statutes concerning First Amendment freedoms need to be care-
fully constructed, the proposed revision of section 45-8-105 will
probably dispel the constitutional difficulties inherent in the
present version of Montana's criminal syndicalism law.
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